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INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Etiological explanations of depression have been 
proposed by a number of theorists, representing medical (see 
Akiskal & McKinney, 1975), intrapsychic (e.g., Freud, 1957), 
cognitive (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Beck, 
1967; Seligman, 1975), and interpersonal (e.g., Coyne, 
1976a; Lewinsohn, 1974) perspectives. Despite the various 
causal propositions, there is general agreement on the most 
common symptoms of depression: Mental health professionals 
and lay people easily recognize dejected mood, negative 
self-concept, self-reproach, and feelings of worthlessness. 
This transparent or obvious nature of the depressive person 
has stimulated a new focus in depression research, namely, 
depressive self-presentation (Hill, Weary, & Williams, 
1986). Such an approach considers socially observable 
depressive symptoms to be, at least in part, intentional 
ploys designed to manage or control interpersonal relation-
ships. 
This theoretical position is not recent. Depressed 
people have been characterized as blackmailing others for 
attention (Fenichel, 1945), as construing others as objects 
capable of providing sympathy (Cohen, 1954), and more 
recently as providing" ... a set of messages demanding 
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reassurance of the person's place in the interactions he is 
still able to maintain ... " (Coyne, 1976a, p. 33). Despite 
the history of recognition by theorists of the intentional, 
and/or goal-directed nature of depressives' social actions, 
research has primarily focused on testing the more mechanis-
tic theories of Beck (1967), Seligman (1975; also see 
Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), and Lewinsohn (1974), 
which do not incorporate concepts like intentions or goals. 
The purpose of this thesis is to extend the empirical 
literature related to the depressive self-presentation 
perspective. Chapter I continues with an explication of the 
most recent depressive self-presentation theory (i.e., Hill 
et al., 1986). This is followed by an examination of 
research that can be used to evaluate this perspective. 
Chapter II then provides an overview of the thesis experi-
ment, and delineates the hypotheses for the main dependent 
variable. Additional variables are introduced in Chapter 
III, and corresponding hypotheses are presented. The method 
and results are the topics of Chapters IV and V, respective-
ly. Finally, the results are discussed in Chapter VI. 
Depressive Self-Presentation 
Strategic self-presentation has been defined as "the 
more or less intentional control of appearances in order to 
guide and control the responses made by others to us" (Weary 
& Arkin, 1981, p. 225). Arkin (1981) added a distinction 
between a protective self-presentation style and the gener-
ally recognized acquisitive (to acquire or gain social 
approval) self-presentation style. The protective self-
presentation style is conceptualized as a conservative 
orientation toward social interactions associated with a 
preoccupation with what can be lost through interactions 
rather than what can be gained. 
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Recently, Hill, Weary, and Williams (1986) proposed a 
self-presentation formulation of depression that claims 
depressives typically employ a protective self-presentation 
style. To rationalize this view, these authors propose that 
self-doubt, low self-confidence, and social anxiety increase 
the probability that a depressed individual, within a social 
interaction context, will experience elevated concern over 
social evaluations. This evaluation apprehension, in turn, 
leads him or her to employ a protective self-presentation 
style across a variety of social interaction settings. For 
depressives, the common manifestations of this interpersonal 
style are expected to be highly modest descriptions of 
accomplishments, social reticence, and in extreme cases, 
social avoidance or withdrawal (Hill et al., 1986). Despite 
the suggestion that social avoidance is an extreme expres-
sion of depressive self-presentation, Hill et al. argue that 
"the underlying motive is likely to be avoidance of future 
performance demands and potential further losses in self-
esteem" (1986, p. 214). Moreover, they claim that depres-
sives may endure short-term discomfort to achieve this goal 
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(1986, p. 234). 
Before reviewing empirical evidence related to the Hill 
et al. (1986) formulation, a few theoretical and meta-
theoretical issues are addressed. First, the Hill et al. 
(1986) theory does not attempt to explain the etiology of 
depression. In fact, in the current explication, it is not 
clear whether a protective self-presentation style could 
exist prior to the onset of depression as, perhaps, a 
predisposing factor. At best then, Hill et al.'s (1986) 
theory concerns itself with the maintenance and exacerbation 
of depression. Second, the hypothesized chain of events 
that leads to the adoption of a protective self-presentation 
style is quite mechanistic and thus fundamentally at vari-
ance with an intentional formulation. Typically, theories 
incorporating intentions do not juxtapose these intentions 
with efficient causation (i.e., "billiard ball causation;" 
one event leads to another event that leads to another event 
... , in a time-ordered relationship), as does the suggestion 
that social anxiety and self-doubt lead to evaluation 
apprehension and then the intentional adoption of a protec-
tive self-presentation style. Moreover, Hill et al.'s 
(1986) formulation is weak insofar as the theoretical per-
spective shifts between what Rychlak (1990) would term an 
extraspective orientation (e.g., social anxiety) and an 
introspective orientation (e.g., self-doubt, evaluation 
apprehension, intention). Briefly, an extraspective orien-
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tation tends to ignore the conscious experiences of the 
subject, while an introspective orientation considers 
conscious experiences. Thus, to use both extraspective and 
introspective concepts begs the question of which concepts 
are primary. For example, does self-doubt cause social 
anxiety or vice versa? It would be metatheoretically more 
consistent to use either the extraspective or the introspec-
tive orientation, but not both. 
Review of Empirical Evidence 
Only one study has attempted to test Hill et al.'s 
(1986) main contention that depressives' primary goal in 
self-presentation is the avoidance of future performance 
demands and potential self-esteem loss. This study, con-
ducted by Weary and Williams (1990), employed a strategic 
failure paradigm, and will be presented last because it is 
most relevant to the thesis experiment. First, several 
studies that were conducted to test other theories, but 
indirectly test the depressive self-presentation formu-
lation, will be reviewed. 
Public-private Manipulations 
One method employed to assess self-presentation motives 
in depression is a manipulation of publicity. Four such 
studies will be reviewed. Although none of these experi-
ments was designed specifically to test the Hill et al. 
(1986) formulation, the public-private manipulation can 
assess its premise. A finding that depressives exhibit more 
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pathological behaviors and verbalizations in public than in 
private would be supportive of the idea that depressives 
intentionally modify their behaviors and verbalizations when 
in a social context. 
Sacco and Hokanson (1978; 1982) conducted two studies 
that incorporated a public-private manipulation. In both, 
the public condition was defined as having an experimenter 
present, and the private condition was defined as having no 
experimenter present. In the 1978 study, Sacco and Hokanson 
measured subjects' performance expectation change before 
each trial of a 15-trial perceptual task, while randomly 
administering success and failure feedback after each trial 
(50% success, 50% failure). A total expectancy change score 
was computed such that higher scores indicated expectations 
for better performance on the upcoming task. The research-
ers found a significant mood x publicity interaction indi-
cating that depressed subjects reported more positive 
expectancy change in private than in public conditions, 
while nondepressed subjects reported more positive expectan-
cy change in public than in private conditions. Only the 
depressed-private versus nondepressed-private comparison was 
statistically significant; however, given that the group 
size was 8 (resulting in low statistical power), the large 
effect sizes of the study, in this particular pattern, can 
arguably be considered supportive of the Hill et al. (1986) 
depressive self-presentation theory. 1 
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In the 1982 study, Sacco and Hokanson measured de-
pressed and nondepressed subjects' self-reinforcement for 
prior task performance on a 22-trial skill task, while 
controlling the success rate such that subjects received 
either a high rate of success followed by a low rate of 
success (high-low), or vice versa (low-high). Analysis of 
average self-reinforcement revealed a significant mood x 
publicity x success rate interaction. To investigate this 
further, Sacco and Hokanson conducted separate mood x 
publicity analyses for successful and unsuccessful trials. 
Only the analysis for successful trials yielded a statisti-
cally significant result, namely a mood x publicity interac-
tion. Although no group comparisons were statistically 
significant, depressed subjects self-reinforced numerically 
more often in private than in public, whereas nondepressed 
subjects self-reinforced numerically more often in public 
than in private. Unfortunately, no standard deviations were 
provided, which render an estimate of effect sizes impossi-
ble. However, given the small average group size of 9, and 
the resulting low statistical power (see footnote 1), this 
pattern of results arguably supports the Hill et al. depres-
sive self-presentation theory. 
Silven and Hokanson (1987) extended the work of Sacco 
and Hokanson (1978; 1982) by investigating the self-evalua-
tions of depressed and nondepressed subjects in an interper-
sonal task. They reasoned that the tasks employed in the 
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work of Sacco and Hokanson (1978; 1982) were innocuous, 
nonsocial laboratory tasks and that the findings were 
therefore limited in generalizability. In their study, 
depressed and nondepressed subjects were asked to speak 
extemporaneously to a "fellow subject" (confederate) on 12 
topics, for 90 seconds per topic. Half of the subjects 
performed this task in the presence of an experimenter 
(public setting) and the remaining subjects performed this 
task with the experimenter absent (private setting). After 
each speech, subjects rated their own performance. Results 
indicate a significant mood x publicity interaction such 
that depressed subjects in the private condition rated their 
performance significantly more favorably than depressed 
subjects in the public condition, whereas nondepressed-
public subjects did not differ from nondepressed-private 
subjects. So, with an interpersonal task, Silven and 
Hokanson replicated the supportive findings of previous 
public-private experiments. It is interesting to note that 
the effect sizes (see Footnote 1) of this study were compa-
rable to those of Sacco and Hokanson (1978; 1982), yet this 
study yielded significant findings and Sacco and Hokanson's 
did not. The likely reason is that Silven and Hokanson 
(1987) had more statistical power with a group size of 24 
(see Footnote 1). 
Finally, Layne, Lefton, Walters, and Merry (1983) 
employed a different type of public-private manipulation and 
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found no mood x publicity interaction. These researchers 
defined "public" as a condition in which subjects were told 
that an experimenter would meet with them at a later date to 
discuss their responses to various questionnaires. "Pri-
vate" was defined as a condition in which subjects were told 
that their responses to questionnaires would remain conf i-
dential. In contrast to the previously mentioned public-
private manipulations (Sacco & Hokanson, 1978, 1982; Silven 
& Hokanson, 1987), the experimenter was always present. 
Results revealed only main effects, with depressives exhib-
iting more pathology than nondepressives. On the one hand, 
this finding seems at odds with Hill et al.'s (1986) depres-
sive self-presentation theory; regardless of publicity 
level, depressives displayed more pathology than non-
depressives, suggesting this display was not for the sake of 
social goals. On the other hand, if the efficacy of Layne 
et al. 's public-private manipulation is questioned, and one 
considers all experimental conditions to be public because 
the experimenter was always present, this finding is sup-
portive of Hill et al.'s (1986) formulation; that is, 
depressives reported more pathology than nondepressives in a 
public setting. 
In sum, these public-private experiments may be inter-
preted as bolstering the position that depressives tend to 
exhibit different, usually more modest, behaviors and 
verbalizations in public than in private conditions, which 
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supports Hill et al. 's (1986) depressive self-presentation 
formulation. It is important to underscore, however, that 
the effects of these studies often did not achieve statisti-
cal significance (e.g., Sacco & Hokanson, 1978, 1982). This 
was likely due to low statistical power, but may also have 
been due to weaknesses inherent in the manipulation of 
publicity. Indeed, several authors have questioned the 
strength of this manipulation (e.g., Arkin & Baumgardner, 
1986; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). One concern is that some 
self-presentations are intended for the self or imagined 
audiences; thus, the presence or absence of an experimenter 
may not produce different behaviors (Tetlock & Manstead, 
1985). A second related concern is that public behaviors 
are not orthogonal to private behaviors; that is, behaviors 
exhibited in public may affect one's private behaviors and 
vice versa (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). Finally, a social 
context or setting may not be directly related to self-
presentations (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1986). 
Self-handicapping 
Self-handicapping has been described as a self-presen-
tation strategy whereby a person presents some impediment 
that could interfere with his or her ability to perform 
future tasks; in essence, an excuse for poor future perfor-
mance is provided (cf. Baumgardner, Lake, & Arkin, 1985). 
Although this strategy may result in acquisition of self-
esteem if one is successful in future performances, the main 
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goal of this strategy is considered protective (see Arkin & 
Baumgardner, 1986). Thus, finding that depressives self-
handicap would be supportive of Hill et al.'s (1986) depres-
sive self-presentation theory insofar as depressives would 
have employed a protective self-presentation style. Unfor-
tunately, despite the fact that self-handicapping has 
received much empirical attention (e.g., Baumgardner, Lake, 
& Arkin, 1985; Berglas & Jones, 1978; Jones & Berglas, 1978; 
Smith, Snyder, & Handelsman, 1982; Snyder, Smith, Augelli, & 
Ingram, 1985), assessment of whether depressives employ 
self-handicapping strategies has largely been ignored. Two 
exceptions were an experiment conducted by Baumgarder, Lake, 
and Arkin (1985), which did not incorporate a depression-
nondepression subject variable, but which indirectly tested 
the feasibility of this notion, and a subsequent study 
conducted by Baumgardner (1991), which did incorporate a 
mood subject variable, and thus provided a more direct test. 
Baumgardner, Lake, and Arkin (1985) investigated 
whether subjects (no mood subject variable was employed) 
would implicate depressed mood as a handicap for a future 
performance. Participants first completed a "social accura-
cy" test, which was described as a measure of ability to 
make judgments about other peoples' personalities and 
motivations. Subjects then received false feedback indicat-
ing that they had failed. Half of the subjects were told 
that the experimenter was aware of their performance ("pub-
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lie"), while the remaining subjects were told that the 
experimenter was not aware of their performance ("pri-
vate"). 2 A second task, ostensibly a separate experiment 
assessing memory, was then described. Half of the subjects 
were led to believe that poor mood would inhibit performance 
on this second task, while the other half received no 
handicapping information. All subjects then completed a 
mood questionnaire and were led to believe that the experi-
menter would be aware of the affective state that it re-
vealed. Results indicated that subjects who believed that 
the experimenter was unaware of their previous failure, and 
that negative mood would inhibit performance on the upcoming 
task, were more likely to report disturbed affect than when 
they believed that the experimenter had knowledge of their 
previous failure. 
The investigators concluded that subjects with "a 
spoiled public identity" had no reason to protect their 
public image from damage and thus did not need to handicap 
their future performance, while subjects who had privately 
failed could still protect their untainted public image by 
employing the handicap of poor mood. Baumgardner et al. 
(1985) confronted the possible alternative explanation that 
the negative affect expressed by subjects may have been due 
to "failure." The researchers claimed that this was doubt-
ful because a public failure seems more likely to produce 
negative affect than a private failure, and their findings 
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displayed the opposite pattern. 
Although Baumgardner, Lake, and Arkin (1985) did not 
assess whether depressives would implicate their mood as a 
handicap, the finding that subjects in general present poor 
mood as a handicap suggests the likelihood that depressives 
present their legitimate affective disturbance as a handi-
cap. Empirical support for this inference is provided in a 
subsequent study by Baumgardner (1991), which incorporated a 
depression-nondepression subject variable and roughly the 
same methodology as Baumgardner et al. (1985). Subjects 
first completed a "social accuracy" test and were led to 
believe that either the experimenter would be aware of how 
well they performed ("public") or not aware ("private;" see 
footnote 2). In contrast to the Baumgardner et al. (1985) 
study, in which all subjects were given failure feedback, 
half of the subjects were given success feedback and half 
were given failure feedback for the initial task. Then, 
half of the subjects were told that a negative mood would 
handicap their performance on an upcoming "memory task." 
Finally, the mood measure was administered and subjects were 
led to believe that the experimenter would be aware of the 
affective state that it revealed. 
When subjects believed poor mood would handicap their 
performance, results indicated the following: (a) after 
publicly succeeding and after publicly failing, depressed 
subjects reported more negative mood than nondepressed 
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subjects; (b) after private failure, depressed subjects 
reported more negative mood than nondepressed subjects; 
(c) after private success, depressed and nondepressed 
subjects did not differ in their presentation of mood 
3 symptoms. No differences in the presentation of mood were 
observed when subjects did not receive handicapping informa-
tion. With only one exception, Baumgardner (1991) consid-
ered these results supportive of her protective self-presen-
tation predictions. The exception was that depressed 
subjects reported more negative mood than nondepressed 
subjects when they publicly failed. This was interpreted by 
Baumgardner as opposing a protective self-presentation 
viewpoint because these depressed-public-failure subjects 
had already "spoiled" their public self-image and should 
have had no reason to self-handicap. However, in contrast 
to this interpretation, one can view this presentation of 
depressive symptoms after public failure as a "damage 
control" maneuver. These subjects failed but still had 
another task to perform. Why not provide a handicap for 
that task to minimize further damage to their public self-
image? It seems that Baumgardner's interpretation is 
inappropriately assuming that depressed subjects should 
claim affective disturbance as a handicap in the same manner 
that all subjects have (as in Baumgardner et al., 1985). 
What is interpreted by Baumgardner as opposing a protective 
self-presentation perspective seems rather to indicate 
uniqueness in depressive self-presentation; that is, 
depressed subjects, in contrast to nondepressed subjects, 
may employ protective self-handicaps, despite a ''spoiled 
public identity," to protect what remains of their public 
image. 
To sum up, these self-handicapping studies supported 
the idea that depressed subjects are more likely than 
nondepressed subjects to adopt an available handicap for 
future performances. Moreover, this handicap may be a 
presentation of depressive symptomatology. Interestingly, 
in contrast to nondepressives, depressives were found to 
persist with such protective self-presentations even when 
they had what Baumgardner referred to as a "spoiled public 
identity" (Baumgardner, 1991; Baumgardner et al., 1985). 
These findings support the Hill et al. (1986) depressive 
self-presentation formulation. 
Consequences of Depressive Self-presentation 
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Hill et al. (1986) claimed that depressives may endure 
short-term discomfort to achieve their protective self-
presentation goals. It is important, therefore, to assess 
the consequences of depressive self-presentation. Two 
predictions follow from the depressive self-presentation 
theory: (1) depressives' pathological or symptomatic self-
presentations may result in negative or unpleasant short-
term consequences; yet, (2) such self-presentations may 
ultimately protect them or provide a more comfortable 
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situation. Once again, data collected for purposes other 
than specifically testing Hill et al. 's (1986) theory can be 
considered. 
The first prediction, that short-term negative conse-
quences follow depressive presentations, has been addressed 
by several studies of the interpersonal consequences of the 
presentation of depressive symptomatology (e.g., Coyne, 
1976b; Hammen & Peters, 1978; Howes & Hokanson, 1978). The 
typical procedure involves the establishment of communica-
tion between a nondepressed subject and either a depressed 
or nondepressed individual. Following this communication, 
interpersonal reactions are measured. In all but a few 
studies, results indicate that people who present depressive 
symptomatology experience social rejection and devaluation 
(cf. Gurtman, Martin, & Hintzman, 1990). These findings 
support Hill et al. 's (1986) contention that depressives 
endure negative consequences after symptomatic presenta-
tions; whether consequences are short-term awaits empirical 
investigation. 
The second prediction, that depressive presentations 
protect depressives or ultimately provide a more comfortable 
situation, was indirectly tested by Schouten and Handelsman 
(1987). These researchers investigated whether presented 
depressive symptoms reduce the amount of personal responsi-
bility people attribute to depressives for their socially 
undesirable behaviors. Since it is probable that reduction 
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of responsibility protects depressives or provides a more 
comfortable situation, this tests the second prediction. 
Schouten and Handelsman (1987) asked subjects to respond to 
vignettes that portrayed protagonists in either a domestic 
violence situation or a poor job performance situation. The 
protagonists were described as (a) experiencing no symptoms 
of depression, (b) experiencing symptoms of depression, or 
(c) experiencing symptoms of depression and having a history 
of depressive episodes. Findings indicated that, across 
situations, depressive symptoms significantly reduced 
subjects' attributions of the protagonist's personal respon-
sibility. Thus, as Hill et al. (1986) suggested, a 
depressed person may benefit from the presentation of 
depressive symptomatology, insofar as people decrease their 
attributions of responsibility for the depressive's 
actions. 
The Strategic Failure Paradigm 
Strategic failure methodology represents a novel 
approach to the investigation of self-presentation. The 
general procedure involves the creation of a situation in 
which failure is a possible means for a subject to achieve 
hypothesized self-presentation goals, yet success is attain-
able by virtually all subjects. With this design, when a 
subject fails, it is likely that he or she did so intention-
ally. 
Weary and Williams (1990) designed a strategic failure 
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experiment specifically to test Hill et al. 's (1986) claim 
that the main goal of depressive self-presentation is the 
avoidance of future performance demands and potential losses 
in self-esteem. Depressed and nondepressed subjects per-
formed a simple visual-motor task. Half the depressed and 
nondepressed subjects were told that if they were successful 
on the task, they would perform a second similar task, while 
the remaining subjects were not given this expectation of a 
conditional future performance. Results indicated that, 
compared to all other subjects, depressed-future-performance 
subjects were more likely to fail. In addition, these 
depressed-future-performance subjects experienced more 
negative affect as a result of their poor performance. The 
authors concluded that these results support the Hill et al. 
(1986) formulation of depressive self-presentation. Depres-
sives seemed to fail intentionally in order to avoid a 
future performance, and they endured negative affect as a 
result. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The literature offers a good deal of converging support 
for Hill et al. 's (1986) formulation of depressive self-
presentation. Depressed subjects exhibited more pathologi-
cal behaviors and verbalizations in public than in private 
(Sacco & Hokanson, 1978, 1982; Silven & Hokanson, 1987), and 
they tended to present depressive symptoms most when doing 
so would serve as a handicap to protect their public self-
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image (Baumgardner, 1991). In addition, there was evidence 
suggesting that presentations of depressive symptoms indeed 
serve a protective function in society (Schouten and 
Handelsman, 1987), yet result in negative consequences, 
particularly social rejection (e.g., Coyne, 1976b; Hammen & 
Peters, 1978; Howes & Hokanson, 1979; Weary & Williams, 
1990). Finally, the proposed depressive self-presentation 
primary goal of avoiding future performance demands was 
supported (Weary & Williams, 1990). 
Despite substantial indirect evidence, Hill et al. 's 
(1986) depressive self-presentation theory has received very 
little attention from researchers. Weary and Williams 
(1990), with their strategic failure experiment, provided 
the only direct test of this formulation. It is because of 
this dearth of direct evidence, and the striking findings of 
the Weary and Williams (1990) study, that a replication and 
extension of the strategic failure methodology was employed 
in the current study. 
CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW AND MAIN HYPOTHESES 
The Weary and Williams (1990) study yielded a large 
effect suggesting that depressives will strategically fail, 
as a self-presentation strategy, in order to avoid a future 
performance. For the sake of replicating this meaningful 
finding, the previously described strategic failure method-
ology was employed in the current study, but with important 
modifications. These methodological extensions addressed 
two weaknesses in the Weary and Williams (1990) study. By 
way of an elaboration on these weaknesses and the present 
experiment's methodological means of confronting them, the 
first section of this chapter provides an overview of the 
current experiment and the main dependent variable. The 
remainder of the chapter delineates hypotheses for the main 
dependent variable, as derived from depressive self-presen-
tation theory (i.e., Hill et al., 1986). 
Experiment Overview 
The first problem with the Weary and Williams (1990) 
experiment was that the task employed (pushing pins into a 
corkboard) may have been unimportant to subjects. Depressed 
subjects might have failed because they were not motivated 
to perform a second similar task, rather than because of a 
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desire to avoid a future performance and the potential self-
esteem loss associated with such a performance. It is also 
difficult to imagine a task in the "real world" that would 
parallel the task employed in the Weary and Williams (1990) 
study. Even if such trivial tasks exist in the environment, 
it seems questionable that failure on these tasks would have 
important consequences. The implications of intentional 
failure on an important task would certainly be more signif-
icant. If depressives also intentionally fail important 
tasks, it would suggest that they are willing to debase 
others' current perceptions of them, along important dimen-
sions, merely to avoid the possibility of future negative 
evaluations. This would be a highly dysfunctional charac-
teristic and seems more likely to result in maintenance 
and/or exacerbation of depression than intentional failure 
on trivial tasks. Thus, an investigation of strategic 
failure using an important task, rather than a trivial task, 
would contribute significantly to the depression literature. 
To overcome this potential motivation or task impor-
tance problem, a 5-letter anagram task, described as a 
measure of intelligence and a predictor of college grades 
and aptitude test scores, was employed in the current 
experiment. To insure that all subjects were capable of 
passing the task--a requirement of the strategic failure 
methodology--the anagrams were constructed using words that 
were "judged by subjects as being reasonably familiar and 
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concrete," and that have single-solution anagrams (Gilhooly 
& Hay, 1977, p.12). The task was also subjected to pilot 
testing and the criteria for success were selected such that 
all pilot subjects passed. It is noteworthy too that no 
significant difference in performance between depressed and 
nondepressed subjects was observed on this task during pilot 
testing. 
The second problem with the Weary and Williams (1991) 
study was that the experiment did not directly assess 
whether the reason for failure is avoidance of self-esteem 
loss. Recall that the major goals of depressive self-
presentation (Hill et al., 1986) are avoidance of future 
performance demands and the potential loss of self-esteem 
associated with such future performance demands. Indeed, 
Weary and Williams (1990) assessed whether depressed sub-
jects fail in order to avoid a future performance, but they 
provided no means of determining whether avoidance of 
potential self-esteem loss is a goal of strategic failure. 
To examine the notion that depressives strategically 
fail in order to avoid self-esteem loss, a three-level 
variable, which manipulated the expected difficulty of the 
second task compared to the first, was added to the Weary 
and Williams (1990) design. The difficulty of the second 
task was described as "easier," "similar," or "harder" than 
the first; in addition, the second task was defined in terms 
of the number of letters per anagram (3, 5, and 13 letters, 
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respectively). The rationale for the inclusion of this 
manipulation was that depressed subjects led to expect an 
easier future task should be less concerned about future 
loss of self-esteem than depressed subjects who expected a 
harder future task. If avoidance of self-esteem loss is the 
goal of intentional failure, then failure should be less 
likely to occur when the avoidable task is described as 
easier than the first, and more likely to occur when the 
avoidable task is described as harder than the first. 
In brief, the current experiment was a 2 (mood: 
depressed, nondepressed) x 2 (future performance: no future 
performance, future performance) x 3 (difficulty expectancy: 
easier, similar, harder) between-subjects factorial design. 
Main Hypotheses 
Based on the foregoing reasoning, two sets of hypothe-
ses were derived from the Hill et al. (1986) theory. The 
first set of hypotheses predicted performance on the anagram 
task in terms of success and failure. The second set of 
hypotheses predicted the pattern of performance scores 
(varying continuously) across conditions that would be 
supportive of a self-presentation perspective. Hypotheses 
for the dichotomous (success v. failure) analysis of perfor-
mance scores are presented in the following subsection, and 
the final subsection of this chapter delineates hypotheses 
for the analysis of performance scores coded as a continuous 
variable. 
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Hypotheses for Success/Failure Performance Analysis 
Among the no-future-performance conditions, failure was 
predicted to be no more likely for depressed subjects than 
for nondepressed subjects, across each of the levels of 
difficulty expectancy. Moreover, little or no failure was 
predicted for these groups. On the other hand, among the 
future-performance conditions, depressed subjects were 
expected to fail more often in the harder condition than the 
similar condition, and more often in the similar condition 
than the easier condition. In contrast, it was hypothesized 
that nondepressed subjects would not fail in any of the 
future-performance conditions--that is, regardless of the 
expected difficulty of the second task. Thus, a 3-way 
interaction was predicted. 
Hypotheses for Performance Score Analysis 
This study employed a more important task than Weary 
and Williams (1990) to challenge and/or extend the finding 
of depressive strategic failure. The aim was to better 
determine the conditions under which a depressed person will 
or will not intentionally fail. Indeed, little or no 
failure, particularly in all but the depressed-future-
performance-harder condition, was considered a distinct 
possibility, because of the importance of the first 
task and the potential loss of self-esteem related to 
intentional failure on that task. What must not be 
forgotten, however, is that the critical concern, of both 
the weary and Williams (1990) study and the current study, 
is testing depressive self-presentation theory. Strategic 
failure is one of many potential empirical observations 
sufficient to support depressive self-presentation theory; 
however, strategic failure is not necessary for the theory 
to be supported. Thus, if no intentional failure is found 
in the current study, Hill et al. 's (1986) theory could 
remain intact. Moreover, performance scores, coded as a 
continuous variable, may nonetheless be supportive of 
depressive self-presentation theory. Let us consider how 
this might be so. 
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If, as theoretically expected, subjects vary across 
conditions in terms of their desire to avoid the future task 
(theoretically due to differential probability of loss to 
self-esteem across conditions), performance scores should be 
appropriately affected, insofar as toying (mentally and/or 
behaviorally) with failure on the first task will likely 
decrease first task performance. For example, a depressed 
subject expecting a harder second task will likely entertain 
the possibility of intentional failure more than a depressed 
subject expecting a similar task or an easier task. It 
follows that performance scores should be lower for a 
depressed subject expecting a harder second task than for a 
depressed subject expecting an easier second task, regard-
less of whether any subjects decided to fail the task. 
More formally and fully, it was predicted that among 
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the no-future-performance conditions, no differences in 
performance will emerge for depressed subjects, nor for 
nondepressed subjects, across the levels of difficulty 
expectancy. On the other hand, among the future-performance 
conditions, depressed subjects were expected to perform more 
poorly in the harder condition than the similar condition, 
and more poorly in the similar condition than the easier 
condition. In contrast, it was hypothesized that no perfor-
mance differences would emerge for nondepressed subjects, in 
any of the future-performance conditions--that is, regard-
less of the expected difficulty of the second task. Thus, a 
3-way interaction was predicted. 
CHAPTER III 
ADDITIONAL VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
In addition to measurement of task performance, this 
study, like Weary and Williams (1990), includes measures of 
other theoretically relevant constructs, namely, affective 
distress, causal attributions, and self-evaluation. While 
elaborate descriptions of all measurements employed will 
follow (see chapter IV), this chapter shall briefly discuss 
the a priori predictions for affective distress, causal 
attributions, and self-evaluation. 
Affective Distress 
There were two main reasons for the measurement of 
affective distress. One reason was to assess changes in 
distress associated with the future performance and diffi-
culty manipulations. Another reason was to assess the 
impact of subjects' performance on their affective distress. 
Each aim shall be dealt with in turn. 
First, the impact of the future performance and dif f i-
cul ty expectation manipulations on distress will be investi-
gated to determine whether, as Hill et al. (1986) claimed, 
depressed subjects experience more distress than non-
depressed subjects when confronted with performance demands. 
Specifically, based on Hill et al., it was expected that 
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depressed subjects expecting a future performance will be 
more distressed than all other subjects (depressed and 
nondepressed). Furthermore, if self-esteem loss is a 
concern, depressed subjects expecting a harder second task 
should exhibit more distress than depressed subjects expect-
ing a similar task, and depressed subjects expecting a 
similar task should exhibit more distress than depressed 
subjects expecting an easier second task. 
Regarding the second aim, affective distress was 
expected to be greater for depressed subjects who fail than 
for all other subjects. This prediction was theoretically 
derived from Hill et al. (1986), but was also based on Weary 
and Williams's (1990) empirical finding of relatively more 
negative affect among depressed subjects who failed their 
initial task, than among other depressed subjects who did 
not fail, and all nondepressed subjects. 
Causal Attributions 
According to Hill et al. 's (1986) depressive self-
presentation theory, depressives report depressogenic 
attributions for negative events not because they truly 
possess a "depressogenic attributional style," as cognitive 
theorists claim (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 
1978), but rather as a self-presentation strategy. In this 
study, as in Weary and Williams (1990), performance attribu-
tions were measured after subjects had performed the anagram 
task; hence, depressed-failure subjects would not need to 
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present depressogenic attributions for self-presentation 
purposes because the hypothesized main goal of avoidance 
would have been achieved through failure. Accordingly, it 
was predicted that no significant differences in attribu-
tions among depressed-failure, depressed-success, and 
nondepressed subjects would be observed, as was the case in 
Weary and Williams (1990). 
Self-evaluation 
A measure of self-evaluation was given to subjects 
prior to any experimental manipulations. Following Weary 
and Williams (1990), the purpose of the administration was 
to assess whether the current sample of depressed subjects 
have "shaky self-confidence and numerous self-doubts" (p. 
895) like most depressives. This was important to determine 
because Hill et al. 's (1986) theory suggests that poor self-
evaluation (confidence, etc.) are important antecedents of a 




Subjects were 309 undergraduates from the introductory 
psychology subject pool of Loyola University of Chicago. 
Eighty-seven subjects were male (28.2%), and 222 subjects 
were female (71.8%). Scores of 10 or greater on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) 
placed 112 subjects (26 males; 86 females) in the depressed 
group (~ = 16.41, SD= 5.80), and scores of 9 or lower 
placed 197 subjects (61 males; 136 females) in the non-
depressed group (M = 4.84, SD= 2.61). A block randomiza-
tion procedure was employed, by four investigators, to place 
each depressed and nondepressed subject in one of the six 
experimental conditions. No blocking for gender was em-
ployed because no gender differences were expected. 
Table 1 displays the mean BDI score, the BDI standard 
deviation, and the number of subjects, per group. To assess 
whether there were differences in level of depression 
associated with the future performance and/or difficulty 
expectancy conditions, simple effects and interactions of 
these variables were investigated for the depressed and 
nondepressed groups. Only for depressed subjects did an 
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Table 1 
BDI Means and Standard Deviations per Group. 
Difficulty Expectancy 
Easier Similar Harder 
Depressed 
17.21a 14.lla 1S.06a Future Task M 
Expected SD 7.2S 3.23 4.39 
n 19 18 18 
No Future Task M 17.84a 17.6Sa 16.33a 
Expected SD 8.04 S.6S 4.27 
n 19 20 18 
Nondepressed 
4.84b 4.33b 4.78b Future Task M 
Expected SD 2.9S 2.SS 2.80 
n 31 33 32 
No Future Task M S.24b 4.71b S.12b 
Expected SD 2.48 2.S8 2.42 
n 33 3S 33 
Note: Different superscripts denote a significant differ-
ence, at p < .OS, according to Tukey (HSD) computations. 
effect emerge: a simple future-performance main effect 
(F(l,297) = S.24, p < .OS), which indicated that depressed 
subjects expecting a future performance (~ = lS.49, SD = 
S.3S) were slightly less depressed (effect size of roughly 
.3; see Cohen, 1988) than depressed-no-future-performance 
subjects (M = 17.30, SD= 6.12). This finding was consid-
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ered important to keep in mind for the interpretation of the 
results; however, Tukey's "honestly significant difference" 
(HSD) contrasts among BDI means revealed no significant 
differences (ps > .OS) across the depressed conditions, 
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which suggested that the simple effect may have been due to 
chance alone (see Table 1). 
Materials 
(Note: Appendices contain all materials except the BDI and 




The anagram task (Appendix A) contained 30 5-letter, 
single solution anagrams. The words used were selected from 
the Gilhooly and Hay (1977) list. Words were "not plurals, 
were not proper names, could be used as nouns, and were 
judged by subjects as being reasonably familiar and con-
crete" (Gilhooly & Hay, 1977, p.12). Anagrams were created 
by randomly scrambling word letters. Based on pilot data, 
success was defined as 13 or more items correct in 12 
minutes or less. All pilot subjects (~ = 39; 15 depressed 
and 24 nondepressed, using same BDI criteria as the current 
study) succeeded based on these criteria. Moreover, no 
significant performance difference between depressed and 
nondepressed subjects was observed on this task (t(37) = 
1.25, 2 > .OS). 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
The BDI (Beck et al., 1979) is frequently employed in 
psychological research as a measure of depressive symptom-
atology. The instrument has demonstrated acceptable inter-
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nal consistency (coefficient alpha range of .73 to .92 in 
non-psychiatric samples; see Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988), 
and adequate evidence of content, construct, and concurrent 
validity in student samples has been reported (see Beck et 
al., 1988; Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 1978). The 
discriminant validity of the BDI is still at issue, however 
(see Beck et al., 1988 vs. Gotlib, 1984). A cut-off score 
of 10 or greater as indicative of depression is consistent 
with Kovacs and Beck's (1977) classification of subjects as 
at least mildly depressed. 
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL) 
The MAACL (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) is a list of mood-
related adjectives. For the "state" version, which was used 
in the current study, subjects place a check mark next to 
the adjectives that describe their current mood. Three 
scores are typically derived: a depression score, a hostil-
ity score, and an anxiety score. For the present experi-
ment, the MAACL was randomly divided into two short forms 
with an equal number of depression, hostility, and anxiety 
items on each (Appendix B). One form was administered prior 
to the experimental manipulations (Time 1), and the other 
was administered after subjects completed the anagram task 
(Time 2). To control for possible form differences, the 
order of administration was counterbalanced. 
Although the MAACL (complete form) has displayed 
adequate internal reliability (coefficient alpha range of 
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.74 to .83; Lubin, Zuckerman, Hanson, Armstrong, Rinck, & 
seever, 1986), evidence has suggested that the subscales of 
the MAACL poorly discriminate among specific affective 
states (see Clark & Watson, 1991). Based on this evidence, 
and for the sake of the increased reliability inherent in a 
longer form, a composite "distress" score was used in 
analyses. 
Performance Attributions Questionnaire (PAQ) 
After the anagram task and the post-performance manipu-
lation check questionnaire (PPMC; to be described), subjects 
completed a 2-page performance attributions questionnaire 
(Appendix C). The first page requested that subjects rate, 
on 11-point Likert-type scales, the extent to which their 
success or failure on the experimental task was due to task 
difficulty, their effort, and their ability. Also, subjects 
rated the extent to which their performance was under their 
own control. These four questions were based on the ideas 
of Heider (1958; see also Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, 
& Rosenbaum, 1972), and were similar to those used in Weary 
and Williams (1990). 
The second page of the PAQ requested that subjects rate 
whether the cause of their success or failure on the experi-
mental task was due to them or something else, will be 
present in the future when doing similar tasks, and will 
influence performance on other types of tasks. Also, 
subjects rated the importance of their success or failure on 
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the experimental task. These four questions were modeled 
after the frequently used Attributional Style Questionnaire 
(ASQ; Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, 
Seligman, 1982). 
Rosenberg Self-esteem Inventory 
The Rosenberg Inventory (Rosenberg, 1969) consists of 
10 Likert-type, face-valid self-evaluation questions. This 
measure is frequently employed in psychological research as 
a measure of self-esteem and it has demonstrated adequate 
internal consistency (coefficient alpha range of .72 to .87; 
cf. Wylie, 1974) and test-retest reliability (r = .85; cf. 
Wylie, 1974). There is some debate, however, based on 
factor analytic studies, about whether the questionnaire 
measures a unidimensional construct (Wylie, 1974). For 
example, some authors have argued (e.g., Kaplin & Pokorny, 
1969) that two dimensions are being measured: self-deroga-
tion and defense of self-worth. 
Control Variables 
Word fluency 
As a measure of the speed and ease with which words are 
used, the Word Fluency component of the Schaie-Thurstone 
Adult Mental Abilities Test (Schaie, 1985) was administered 
prior to any experimental manipulations. The task requires 
that subjects write as many words as possible that begin 
with the letter "S" during a five-minute period (see Appen-
dix D for the form used). If subjects differ on this 
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measure across conditions, it will be entered into statisti-
cal computations as a covariate to insure that differences 
in performance on the anagram task are not due to verbal 
ability. Although little empirical evidence exists to 
assess the validity of this task as a measure of verbal 
ability, adequate test-retest reliability has been demon-
strated (r range of .70 to .78; cf. Schaie, 1985). 
Writing Speed 
As a measure of motor speed, subjects were asked to 
write as many numbers as possible, from 100 backward, during 
a one-minute period (see Appendix E for the form used). 
This task was administered at Time 1 and Time 2. If differ-
ences on this measure are observed across conditions at Time 
1, the Time 1 scores will be entered as a covariate in 
statistical computations to insure that performance on the 
anagram task was not influenced by motor speed. This face 
valid measure has not been empirically validated but has 
been similarly employed in depression research because 
psychomotor retardation often accompanies depression (Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third 
Edition, Revision [DSM-III-R]; American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 1987). 
Pre-Manipulation Questionnaire (Pre-MC) 
Immediately before the anagram task, subjects completed 
the Pre-MC (Appendix F), which consists of two items on 11-
point Likert-type scales: (a) "Please rate how important it 
37 
is for you to do well on this task," and (b) "Please rate 
how much experience you have with this type of task." This 
questionnaire was included for two reasons. One reason was 
to assess whether subjects considered the task to be impor-
tant, as this was considered a significant difference 
between the current task and the task employed in Weary and 
Williams (1990). The other reason was to control, if 
differences exist across conditions, for the effects of 
perceived task importance and prior experience on anagram 
performance by including the items as covariates in statis-
tical analyses. 
Manipulation Checks 
Post-performance Manipulation Check Questionnaire (PPMC) 
Immediately following the anagram task, subjects 
completed a questionnaire (Appendix G) that assessed percep-
tions of performance and the efficacy of the manipulations. 
Subjects were asked if their performance was a success or 
failure, and if they expected a second task given success on 
the first task. Then, subjects were asked to rate, on an 
11-point Likert-type scale, how difficult they expected the 
second task to be compared to the first task. 4 Also on 11-
point Likert-type scales, subjects were asked to rate how 
well they performed and their beliefs regarding how well 
they performed compared to other participants in the study. 
Procedure 
(Note: see Appendix H for the scripts read by experiment-
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ers.) 
To increase the atmosphere of evaluation, as in Weary 
and Williams (1990), subjects were run one at a time. Upon 
arrival at the laboratory, subjects read and signed a 
consent form (Appendix I), which indicated that data would 
remain confidential and that subjects could withdraw at any 
time without prejudice. Subjects then completed the Word 
Fluency task, the BDI, the Rosenberg Inventory, the MAACL-
Time 1, and the writing speed task. 
Next, to increase the perceived importance of the 
anagram task, subjects were told that they were going to 
solve some anagrams designed to measure intelligence. Also, 
performance on the anagram task was described as a good 
predictor of college grades and aptitude test performance. 
An example anagram (Appendix A) was presented and the 
criterion for success was described as 13 or more items 
correct in 12 minutes or less. 
Subjects then completed the Pre-MC questionnaire. At 
this point, half of the depressed and nondepressed subjects 
were told that, if and only if they successfully completed 
the anagram task, they would perform a second anagram task 
(future-performance condition). The remaining subjects were 
told that a second anagram task is normally required if the 
first task is successfully completed, but due to time 
constraints, no second task performance would be required 
(no-future-performance condition). In addition, one-third 
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of the depressed and nondepressed subjects were told that 
the second anagram task is very difficult compared to the 
first (harder expectancy condition); another third were told 
that the second anagram task is similar to the first (simi-
lar expectancy condition); the remaining third were told 
that the second anagram task is very easy compared to the 
first (easier expectancy condition). A stopwatch was then 
placed in front of the subjects and they were reminded of 
the criteria for success. 
The anagram task was then administered. The experi-
menter was present while subjects worked, and to heighten 
further the atmosphere of evaluation, as in Weary and 
Williams (1990), the experimenter frequently recorded bogus 
notes. After the maximum time (12 minutes) had elapsed, 
subjects completed the PPMC questionnaire. The experimenter 
then scored the anagram task and told subjects whether their 
performance was a success or failure. Immediately after 
hearing this, subjects completed the writing speed task, the 
MAACL-Time 2, and the PAQ. Finally, subjects were debriefed 
(Appendix I) and dismissed. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Because this study was not designed to assess the role 
of gender in depressive self-presentation, and because the 
number of males in each cell was very low, all analyses were 
collapsed across gender. Due to missing responses for some 
questions/tasks, degrees of freedom varied across analyses. 
Manipulation Checks 
Future Performance Manipulation 
To assess the efficacy of the future performance 
manipulation, item 4 from the PPMC was analyzed. The 
question asked if subjects expected a second task upon 
successful completion of the first task ("yes" or "no"). An 
inspection of the frequencies of "yes" and "no" responses 
per group indicated that all subjects responded in the 
appropriate manner. 
Difficulty Expectancy Manipulation 
Item 5 from the PPMC, which asked subjects how diffi-
cult the second task would be compared to the first, was 
analyzed to assess the effectiveness of the difficulty 
expectancy manipulation. Fourteen subjects were omitted 
from the final sample because they failed to answer this 
question (see note 4). Table 2 presents the number of 
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Table 2 









No Future Task 
Expected 
Difficulty Expectancy 
Easier Similar Harder 
0 0 0 
1 2 1 
0 0 0 
2 4 4 
subjects with a missing response, per condition. 
As can be seen, all such subjects were in the no-future 
performance condition. 
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Concerns over whether inclusion of these subjects would 
have altered the results of computations were attenuated 
because there was no strong cause to believe that these 
subjects experienced the manipulation of difficulty expec-
tancy differently than other subjects since a "mechani-
cal"/non-systematic problem (other than selecting no-future-
performance subjects) led to their omitting a response. 
Indeed, Chi-square goodness of fit tests revealed no evi-
dence of a non-random distribution of the number of subjects 
missing a response across the difficulty expectancy condi-
2 
tions, in both depressed (~ (2) = .50, 2 >.05) and non-
42 
2 
depressed (~ (2) = .80, 2 >.OS) groups. 
PPMC, item 5, was a Likert-type question, bounded by 0 
("much easier") and 10 ("much harder"), and was thus ana-
lyzed with a 3-way (mood x future performance x difficulty 
expectancy) analysis of variance (ANOVA). As expected, only 
a difficulty expectancy main effect was found (F(2,283) = 
486.21, 2 < .0001). Follow-up contrasts indicated that the 
manipulation of difficulty expectancy was effective. 
Subjects in the harder condition (M = 8.54, SD = 1.58) rated 
the second task as harder than subjects in the similar 
condition(~= 5.46, SD= 1.17; !(194) =15.56, 2 < .001), 
and subjects in the similar condition rated the second task 
as harder than subjects in the easier condition (~ = 1.64, 
SD= 1.69; t(l94) =18.56, 2 < .001). 
Control Variables 
Word Fluency 
To determine whether groups differed at time 1 in terms 
of subjects' facility with words, a mood x future perfor-
mance x difficulty expectancy ANOVA was conducted with word 
fluency scores as the dependent variable. No effects 
emerged, although there was a trend for the future perfor-
mance variable (f(l,297) = 3.77, 2 = .053). Subjects in the 
future-performance condition tended to perform better (M = 
47.46, SD= 10.51) than subjects in the no-future-perfor-
mance condition (M = 45.20, SD= 11.89). Given that this 
difference was small (effect size of roughly .2; see Cohen, 
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1988), and nonsignificant, no statistical control for this 
variable was attempted in subsequent analyses. It is 
noteworthy also that, if subjects in the future-performance 
condition fail more than subjects in the no-future perfor-
mance conditions, this would not be attributable to poorer 
verbal ability, as measured by the word fluency task. 
Writing Speed 
To assess whether groups differed in motor speed at 
time 1, a 3-way (mood x future performance x difficulty 
expectancy) ANOVA was conducted with time 1 writing speed as 
the dependent variable. 5 Only a mood x future performance 
interaction was uncovered {F(l,295) = 6.79, £ < .01). As 
can be seen in Table 3, follow-up Tukey (HSD) contrasts 
indicated that groups were not significantly different from 
each other (£S > .OS), despite the apparent disordinal 
interaction. Accordingly, no attempt was made, in subse-
quent analyses, to control for motor speed differences. 
Pre-MC Questionnaire 
Importance ratings (item 1) 
There were two reasons for obtaining ratings of the 
importance of the first task. One reason was to assess 
whether statistical control for differences in importance 
ratings would be required; another reason was to determine 
whether subjects considered the experimental task to be 
important. A 3-way (mood x future performance x difficulty 
expectancy) ANOVA with item 1 of the Pre-MC as the dependent 
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Table 3 
writing Speed Means and Standard Deviations Across Mood and 
Future Performance Variables. 
Future Performance 
Expected Not Expected 
Depressed 
M 58.78a 55.37a 
SD 7.95 10.26 
n 55 96 
M 55.28a 57.71a 
Nondepressed 
SD 9.10 10.20 
n 55 101 
Note: Different superscripts denote a significant differ-
ence, at 2 < .05, according to Tukey (HSD) computations. 
variable found no effects (2s >.05), which indicated that no 
control for importance ratings would be necessary. The 
overall mean of 6.23 (SD= 2.43) out of 10 indicated that 
subjects rated the first task as reasonably important (0 = 
"not at all important" and 10 ="very important"). 
Experience with anagram tasks (item 2) 
To assess whether differences in anagram experience 
existed across conditions, item 2 of the Pre-MC was submit-
ted to a 3-way (mood x future performance x difficulty 
expectancy) ANOVA. Because this analysis did not yield any 
effects (2s > .05), no statistical control for anagram 
experience was attempted in subsequent analyses. On the O 
("no experience at all") to 10 ("a lot of experience") 
scale, subjects' ratings averaged 3.63 (SD= 2.20), suggest-




Whether subjects would fail (i.e., answer less than 13 
anagrams correctly in the allotted 12 minutes) was predicted 
to depend on subjects' mood, whether they expected a future 
task, and whether the future task would be easier, similar, 
or harder than the first. Specifically, among the no-
future-performance conditions, failure was predicted to be 
no more likely for depressed subjects than for nondepressed 
subjects, across the levels of difficulty expectancy. 
Moreover, little or no failure was predicted for these 
groups. On the other hand, among the future-performance 
conditions, depressed subjects were expected to fail more 
often in the harder condition than the control condition, 
and more often in the control condition than the easier 
condition. In contrast, it was hypothesized that non-
depressed subjects would not fail in any of the future-
performance conditions, regardless of the expected difficul-
ty of the second task. 
To test these predictions, the mood, future perfor-
mance, and difficulty expectancy variables were effect coded 
(see, for example, Cohen & Cohen, 1983, pp. 198-204) and 
submitted to a logistic regression analysis. Main effects 
were entered first, followed by 2-way then 3-way interac-
tions. For the omnibus test, a 3-way interaction was 
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expected. Moreover, following this omnibus test, simple 
effects analyses and planned comparisons were expected to 
support the specific hypotheses for this study. Table 4 
displays the number of failures observed for each condition; 
Table 5 shows the results of the omnibus logistic regression 
analysis. 
As can be seen in Table 4, only 9 subjects failed (3% 
of~); one was depressed. Despite this, the logistic 
regression analysis (see Table 5) was conducted, and, not 
surprisingly, no effects (2s > .9) were found. To investi-
gate why some subjects failed the task--given that it was 
not due to mood, future performance, nor difficulty expec-
tancy--Word Fluency scores were compared between subjects 
who failed and subjects who passed. This analysis revealed 
a significant mean difference (!(307) = 2.72, 2 < .01), 
suggesting that failure in this study was due to poor verbal 
ability (~pass = 46.61, SD= 11.11; M fail = 36.33, SD= 
12.86). 
Performance Score Analysis 
As was the case with the success/failure measure, 
subjects' scores on the anagram task were predicted to 
depend on subjects' mood, whether they expected a future 
task, and whether the future task was easier, similar, or 
harder than the first. It was predicted that among 
the no-future-performance conditions, no differences in 
performance would emerge for depressed subjects, nor for 
Table 4 
Observed Failures Across Mood, Future Performance, and 
Difficulty Expectancy Conditions. 
Difficulty Expectancy 
Easier Similar Harder 
Depressed 
Future Task 0 0 0 
Expected ( 19) (18) (18) 
No Future Task 0 1 0 
Expected ( 19) (20) (18) 
Nondepressed 
Future Task 1 2 0 
Expected ( 31) (33) (32) 
No Future Task 0 2 3 
Expected (33) (35) (33) 
Note: Values in parentheses are cell sizes. 
nondepressed subjects, across the levels of difficulty 
expectancy. However, among the future-performance 
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conditions, depressed subjects were expected to perform more 
poorly in the harder condition than the similar condition, 
and more poorly in the similar condition than the easier 
condition. In contrast, it was hypothesized that no perfor-
mance differences would emerge for nondepressed subjects in 
any of the future-performance conditions. 
To test these predictions, a 3-way (mood x future 
performance x difficulty expectancy) ANOVA was conducted 
with the number of incorrect (blanks were coded as 
incorrect) anagrams as the dependent variable. Because 
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Table 5 
Logistic Regression of Mood, Future Performance, and Diffi-
culty Expectancy on Success/Failure. 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig 
M -2.3588 21.4878 .0120 1 .9126 
FP -.8579 21.4878 .0016 1 .9682 
EXP .0142 2 .9929 
Term 1 -1.7014 32.0127 .0028 1 .9576 
Term 2 3.1282 26.3157 . 0141 1 .9054 
M x FP -.6852 21.4878 .0010 1 .9746 
M x EXP .oooo 2 1. 0000 
Term 1 .1583 32.0127 .oooo 1 .9961 
Term 2 -.0420 26.3157 .0000 1 .9987 
FP x EXP .0095 2 .9953 
Term 1 3.0583 32.0127 .0091 1 .9239 
Term 2 -1.4411 26.3157 .0030 1 .9563 
M x FP x EXP .0100 2 .9950 
Term 1 -1.5152 32.0127 .0022 1 .9622 
Term 2 -1. 6450 26.3157 .0039 1 .9502 
Note: M = Mood; FP = Future Performance; EXP = Difficulty 
Expectancy. "Term" refers to an effect coded interaction 
variable. 
subjects who failed the first task had lower verbal ability 
than other subjects, and because their performance scores 
were extreme within their groups, subjects who failed were 
omitted from all performance score analyses (remaining N = 
300). 6 Table 6 presents the results of the omnibus 
ANOVA; Table 7 displays the mean anagram score and standard 
deviation per condition. 
As can be seen in Table 6, although the results 
revealed no reliable effects (2s > .OS), there was a trend 
for the predicted 3-way interaction among the mood, future 
performance, and difficulty expectancy variables (F(2, 288) 
Table 6 
Mood, Future Performance, and Difficulty Expectancy ANOVA 
with Number of Incorrect Anagrams as Dependent Variable . 
source Sum of df Mean F 
Squares Square 
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M 65.24 1 65.24 2.55 0.111 
FP 0.29 1 0.29 0.01 0.916 
EXP 88.34 2 44.17 1. 73 0.179 
M x FP 37.46 1 37.46 1. 47 0.227 
M x EXP 61. 69 2 30.84 1. 21 0.301 
F x EXP 1. 25 2 0.63 0.02 0.975 
M x FP x EXP 128.15 2 64.08 2.51 0.083 
ERROR 7357.65 288 25.55 
Note: M = Mood; FP = Future Performance; EXP = Difficulty 
Expectancy. 
7 = 2.51, 2 < .10) . Given this, a simple effects ANOVA was 
conducted to determine if, as predicted, there was a mood x 
difficulty expectancy interaction for future-performance 
subjects but not the no-future-performance subjects. 
Indeed, while there was no mood x difficulty expectancy 
interaction for no-future-performance subjects (F(2, 288) = 
.75, 2 > .05), a trend was observed for the simple interac-
tion among the future-performance subjects (F(2, 288) = 
2.95, 2 = .054). 
To investigate further the simple mood x difficulty 
expectancy interaction trend for future-performance sub-
jects, follow-up simple effect ANOVAs were conducted. 
Results indicated that, in contrast to predictions, there 
was no effect of difficulty expectancy for depressed-future-
performance subjects (f(2, 288) = 1.02, 2 > .05). There 
Table 7 
Mean Number of Incorrect Anagrams and Standard Deviations 
Across Mood, Future Performance, and Difficulty Expectancy 
Conditions. 
Difficulty Expectancy 
Easier Similar Harder 
Depressed 
6.47a 4.50a 6.67a Future Task M 
Expected SD 5.64 5.24 5.69 
n 19 18 18 
No Future Task M 8.05a 6.42a 5.56a 
Expected SD 6.02 4.79 5.74 
n 19 19 18 
Nondepressed 
6.73al 6.55a 3.66a2 Future Task M 
Expected SD 4.92 5.38 4.11 
n 30 31 32 
No Future Task M 4.94a 5.06a 4.93a 
Expected SD 4.81 4.58 4.69 
n 33 33 30 
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Note: Different lettered superscripts indicate a signifi-
cant (E < .05) difference according to exploratory (all 
cells) Tukey (HSD) contrasts. Different number superscripts 
indicate a significant difference for a posteriori Tukey 
(HSD) follow-up contrasts. Higher scores indicate worse 
performance. 
was, however, an unexpected effect of difficulty expectancy 
for nondepressed-future-performance subjects (f(2,288) = 
3.67, E < .05). According to the follow-up Tukey (HSD) 
contrasts (see Table 7), this was due to nondepressed-
future-performance-harder subjects (M = 3.66, SD= 4.11) 
performing better than nondepressed-future-performance-
easier subjects (~ = 6.73, SD= 4.92; E < .05). 
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Finally, as an exploratory analysis, a comparison of 
the means across all conditions was conducted. Tukey (HSD) 
contrasts indicated that no observed group differences could 
be attributed to more than chance variation (alpha = .05; 
8 see Table 7). 
Affective Distress 
One purpose of measuring affective distress was to 
determine whether depressed subjects who failed experienced 
subsequent distress, as predicted. Unfortunately, a test of 
this prediction was not possible, given that only one 
depressed subject failed. However, a comparison between the 
Time 2 affective distress of subjects who passed and sub-
jects who failed was conducted to determine whether subjects 
who failed should be omitted from subsequent distress 
analyses. The concern was that subjects who failed might be 
considerably more distressed than the majority of their 
group (i.e., because of these subjects, group means might be 
distorted from skewness). To address this concern, a 1-way 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted for the 
success and failure groups, with MAACL-T2 as the dependent 
variable and MAACL-Tl as the covariate. The data were 
suitable for this analysis insofar as the assumption of 
parallelism (homogeneity of regression) was supported (f(l, 
305) = .27, 2 = .60; see Engelman for a description of the 
statistical computation, 1990), and a linear relationship 
was established between the dependent variable (MAACL-T2) 
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and the covariate (MAACL-Tl), for each group (F(l, 306) = 
248.45, £ < .001; see Engelman, 1990). Results indicated no 
difference in Time-2 affective distress between subjects who 
passed (~ = 13.81, SD = 6.97) and subjects who failed (~ = 
15.44, SD= 6.11; F(l, 306) = .07, £ = .79). Thus, there 
was no need to omit subjects who failed from remaining 
distress analyses. 
Another purpose of measuring distress was to assess the 
impact of the future performance and difficulty expectancy 
manipulations on depressed and nondepressed subjects. An 
omnibus 3-way (mood x future performance x difficulty 
expectancy) interaction was expected to surface because of a 
simple interaction for depressed but not nondepressed 
subjects. Specifically, depressed subjects were expected to 
experience more distress from the future-performance-harder 
condition than from the future-performance-similar condi-
tion, and more distress from the future-performance-similar 
condition than from the future-performance-harder condition. 
On the other hand, in the no-future-performance conditions, 
no effect of difficulty expectancy was predicted for de-
pressed subjects. Finally, nondepressed subjects were not 
expected to evidence (statistically) an impact of the future 
performance variable nor the difficulty expectancy vari-
able. 
To test these predictions, a 3-way (mood x future 
performance x difficulty expectancy) ANCOVA was conducted, 
with MAACL-T2 as the dependent variable, and with MAACL-Tl 
and the number of incorrect anagrams (to control for the 
effects of performance on affective distress) as covar-
. t 9 ia es. The assumption of parallelism (homogeneity of 
regression) was supported (fanagrams (11, 285) = 1.01, £ = 
.44; fMAACL-Tl (11, 285) = .39, £ = .96; see Engelman, 
53 
1990), and a linear relationship was established between the 
dependent variable (MAACL-T2) and the covariates for each 
group (fanagrams (1, 296) = 9.58, £ < .003; fMAACL-Tl (1, 
296) = 222.26, £ < .001; see Engelman, 1990). However, the 
Levene statistic (f(ll, 297) = 2.05, £ = .02) indicated that 
the homogeneity of variance assumption for the MAACL-T2 
scores was not supported. Thus, a square-root transforma-
tion (indicated by the slope of a spread-level plot; see 
Norusis, 1990, pp. 99-101) of the MAACL-T2 scores was 
performed, successfully (Levene's f(ll, 297) = 1.85, £ = 
.054), prior to the ANCOVA. 
Results revealed a significant main effect of mood 
(F(l, 295) = 5.32, £ < .OS), which was due to depressed 
subjects experiencing less distress (adjusted~= 3.43) than 
nondepressed subjects (adjusted M = 3.67), and a trend for 
the future performance x difficulty expectancy interaction 
(f(2, 295) = 2.83, £ = .06). To follow-up the interaction 
trend, simple effects ANCOVAs were conducted. Results 
indicated no simple effect of difficulty expectancy at the 
future-performance level, nor at the no-future-performance 
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level. To investigate, then, why the future performance x 
difficulty expectancy trend was observed, the adjusted means 
were inspected. As can be seen in Table 8, the interaction 
was likely due to lower distress among subjects who were not 
expecting a harder future task than among subjects who were 
expecting the harder second task (f(l,295) = 7.62, E < .01). 
No simple future-performance effect was found at the simi-
lar-expectancy condition nor the easier-expectancy condition 
(£S > .05). 
Finally, an exploratory analysis of all remaining group 
comparisons was performed. Engelman's (1990) procedure for 
conducting ~-tests on adjusted means was used to perform all 
possible ~-tests (df = 301). With a Bonferroni-adjustment 
of the £-value (.004, representing .OS divided by the 12 new 
contrasts), results indicated that no group differences 
could be attributed to more than chance variation (Es > 
. 05) . 
Causal Attributions 
In brief, the prediction for causal attributions was 
simple but bold: no differences in attributions among 
conditions. The most theoretically important null finding 
was predicted for a comparison between depressed subjects 
who failed and depressed subjects who did not fail. Of 
course, this test could not be conducted because only one 
depressed subject failed. Nonetheless, to investigate 
whether any unexpected effects transpired, a 3-way (mood x 
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Table 8 
Adjusted Mean Time 2 Distress Across Future Performance and 
Difficulty Expectancy Conditions. 
Difficulty Expectancy 
Easier Similar Harder 
Future Task Ad"M J_ 3.50a 3.58a 3.86al 
Expected n 50 51 50 
No Future Task Ad"M J_ 3.64a 3.45a 3.46a
2 
Expected n 52 55 51 
Note: Covariates were the number of incorrect anagrams and 
Time 1 Distress (MAACL-Tl). MAACL-T2 scores were trans-
formed (power = .5) prior to their adjustment. Different 
number superscripts denote a significant difference (£ < 
.05); different letter superscripts denote a significant 
difference (£ < .05) according to Bonferroni criteria. 
Higher scores indicate greater distress. 
future performance x difficulty expectancy) ANOVA was 
conducted for each one of the attribution variables (Task 
difficulty, Effort, Ability, Luck, Control, Internality-
Externality, Stability-Instability, Global-Specific, Impor-
10 tance). Because this analysis involved 63 tests (i.e., 
the probability of a Type I error was very high, predicting 
3.15 spurious effects), a Bonferroni adjustment of the 
critical £-value for each test was necessary (see Stevens, 
1992, pp. 6-9). The Bonferroni critical £-value was set to 
.001 (.05 divided by 63 tests). 
None of the 3-way ANOVAs yielded an effect that could 
be associated with more than chance variation (£S > .05). 
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In fact, none of the effects reached the trend level of 
significance (£S > .10). The strongest effect was found for 
the Internality-Externality analysis. The mood variable 
reached an adjusted significance level of .25. 11 Although 
it was questionable to follow-up an effect with a £-value of 
.25, the depressed and nondepressed means were nonetheless 
compared on the Internality-Externality ratings. Depressed 
subjects (M = 2.72, SD= 1.37, N = 112) tended to attribute - ~ -
the cause of their performance to external causes more than 
nondepressed subjects (~ = 2.26, SD= 1.26, N = 197). 
Self-Evaluation 
Depressed subjects were expected to have lower self-
evaluation scores (i.e., Rosenberg scores) than nondepressed 
subjects, while no effects were expected for the difficulty 
expectancy nor the future performance variables, nor their 
interaction(s) with mood, because these manipulations were 
implemented after the administration of the Rosenberg 
questionnaire. To test these predictions, a 3-way ANOVA was 
conducted with Rosenberg scores as the dependent measure. 
Results revealed an unexpected significant main effect of 
future performance (K(l, 297) = 6.23, £ < .05), which 
indicated that future-performance subjects (M = 32.40, SD = 
4.99, N = 151) had slightly higher self-evaluations than no-
future-performance subjects (~ = 31.52, SD= 5.52, ~ = 158). 
This effect was qualified, however, by a significant mood by 
future performance interaction (K(l, 297) = 6.66, £ < .05). 
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To explore the mood x future performance interaction, 
inspections of the cell means and follow-up Tukey (HSD) 
contrasts (see Table 9) were executed. Both procedures 
suggested that the interaction was due to higher self-
evaluations for depressed-future-performance subjects than 
for depressed-no-future-performance subjects (effect size of 
roughly .6, which is considered to be of medium magnitude; 
Cohen, 1988). This unexpected finding was deemed important 
12 to keep in mind during the discussion of results. The 
remaining differences across the four conditions were in 
line with predictions: Both depressed-future-performance 
subjects and depressed-no-future-performance subjects had 
lower self-esteem than either of the nondepressed groups 
(future-performance and no-future-performance; 2s < .OS). 
Table 9 
Self-evaluation (Rosenberg Self-esteem) Means and Standard 
Deviations Across Mood and Future Performance Variables. 
Future Performance 
Expected Not Expected 
Depressed 
M 29.29a 26.70bc 
SD 3.94 5.17 
n 55 57 
M 34.19b 34.24b 
Nondepressed 
SD 4.66 3.50 
n 96 101 
Note: Different superscripts denote a significant differ-
ence, at 2 < .OS, according to Tukey (HSD) computations. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to test Hill et al.'s 
(1986) theory of depressive self-presentation. The main 
theses of this perspective are that depressed individuals 
intentionally employ protective (conservative) social 
strategies, and that avoidance of performance demands and 
potential loss to self-esteem are primary goals of these 
strategies. In addition, Hill et al. claimed that depres-
sives would be willing to endure short-term negative conse-
quences to achieve these goals. This chapter discusses the 
results of this study in terms of their implications for 
depressive self-presentation theory. First, a weakness 
(methodological/statistical) of the current study is pre-
sented. Second, the results for the secondary variables 
(causal attributions, self-evaluations, and affective 
distress) are discussed. Third, subjects' actual perfor-
mance (success/failure, incorrect anagrams), the main 
dependent variable, is discussed. Finally, a summary and 
conclusions are presented. 
Methodological/Statistical Considerations 
The major weakness of the current experiment was low 
statistical power. This problem, which runs rampant in many 
58 
59 
areas of research (see Cohen, 1988), was unavoidable because 
of time and resource constraints. The main danger in the 
current study was that legitimate effects might have failed 
to reach statistical significance. To help combat this 
danger, powerful statistical tests were used for the a 
priori analyses (e.g., simple effects analyses instead of 
standard group contrasts). 
Affective distress 
Discussion of Results 
Secondary Variables 
Hill et al. (1986) predicted that a future performance 
would be particularly disturbing to depressed subjects. 
Also, based on Hill et al.'s theory, it was expected that, 
for depressed-future-performance subjects, distress would 
increase as the expected difficulty of the second task 
increased. The results were at odds with the predictions. 
First, depressed subjects were less distressed than non-
depressed subjects overall, and second, depressed and 
nondepressed subjects were affected similarly by the future 
performance and difficulty expectancy manipulations. The 
only significant group difference indicated that all sub-
jects (depressed and nondepressed) expecting a harder future 
task experienced more distress than subjects (depressed and 
nondepressed) not expecting a harder future task. 
Hill et al. (1986) should address these findings if 
they wish to maintain that depressed subjects experience 
more social anxiety than nondepressed subjects when con-
fronted with future performances. In addition, these 
researchers should answer the following question: Why did 
depressed subjects in the future-performance-harder condi-
tion not evidence more depressive self-presentations (via 
performance scores) than depressed subjects in the no-
future-performance-harder condition? Depressed-future-
performance-harder subjects were more distressed than 
depressed-no-future-performance-harder subjects, yet this 
distress did not lead, as hypothesized, to an increase in 
depressive self-presentations. 
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Surely, more powerful future research is needed to 
address these issues. It is also possible that social 
anxiety was not well assessed with the current measure of 
distress (the MAACL), or that the composite distress score 
concealed or modified effects. At the least, however, these 
findings underscore the dangers of imposing mechanistic 
constraints on an intention-based theoretical formulation. 
Recall (see Chapter I, pp. 4-5) that Hill et al. 's (1986) 
theory was considered metatheoretically inconsistent, 
proposing a mechanistic cause of depressives' intentional 
presentations. If Hill et al. (1986) used only intentions 
as explanatory concepts, a subject could behave in accor-
dance with the mechanistic laws relating social anxiety and 
performance, or not (see Rychlak, 1990). Because Hill et 
al. proposed that depressives' intentional self-presenta-
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tions result from increased social anxiety, they must now 
explain how subjects managed to "break" the mechanistic laws 
related to social anxiety in order to succeed. 
Causal attributions 
No effects of mood, future performance, nor difficulty 
expectancy were found for causal attributions. Whether 
there were truly no effects is plainly an open question 
because of the low power of the current study. Future 
research should investigate further, perhaps as the primary 
purpose of the investigation, whether verbalized (or writ-
ten) attributions are best understood as self-presentations. 
In the meantime, it does not seem safe to conclude that 
these results support Hill et al. 's theory, or not. 
Self-evaluations 
As Hill et al. (1986) suggested, depressed subjects 
maintained lower self-evaluations than nondepressed sub-
jects. What was not assessed with the current design was 
whether lower self-evaluations increase the likelihood of 
the adoption of depressive self-presentations. However, 
such a test would be difficult precisely because of the 
close relationship between depression and self-esteem. That 
is, if one were to remove self-esteem variability from 
depression, or vice versa, a highly contrived, virtually 
meaningless construct would remain. Or, put another way, 
there are likely very few high-self-esteem depressed sub-
jects to examine vis-a-vis low-self-esteem depressed sub-
jects. Certainly, this is an issue requiring additional 




Weary and Williams (1990) claimed that, by failing, 
depressed subjects went "beyond self-handicapping," to a 
more pathological form of self-presentation (p. 896). 
Further, these authors suggested that depressed people might 
regularly behave this way, resulting in the maintenance of 
their "shaky self-confidence," and in turn their depression 
(pp. 897-898). These strong conclusions were challenged by 
the current experimental design. Most relevant to the 
challenge was the use of an important task, rather than a 
trivial task (as in Weary and Williams, 1990). The goal was 
to determine whether depressives strategically fail when it 
matters most, when failure will have longer-term conse-
quences (i.e., self-esteem loss; or reduction of "self-
confidence"). Interestingly, the present results displayed 
no evidence of strategic failure among subjects, regardless 
of the expected difficulty of the second task. 
Two conclusions are worthy of discussion. One is that 
Weary and Williams (1990) were victims of an experimental 
fluke, that their finding was not reliable, and depressives 
do not strategically fail. This view is not favored, 
however, precisely because the current study employed a very 
different task than Weary and Williams (1990). The pre-
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ferred conclusion is that there are boundaries to strategic 
failure. Depressed subjects might fail trivial tasks (Weary 
and Williams, 1990), yet try to pass/succeed on important 
tasks (as in the current study). Why would depressed 
subjects fail a trivial task yet not fail an important task? 
Perhaps the self-esteem cost (a long-term consequence) of 
poor current task performance is carefully considered before 
intentional failure is invoked. This would explain the 
disparate findings: When the self-esteem cost of failure 
was high for a current task (the current study), depressed 
subjects did not strategically fail, but when the self-
esteem cost of failure was low (as in Weary and Williams, 
1990), failure was chosen as a means of avoidance. 
In brief, the suggestion is that depressives are 
primarily protective of their self-esteem. Avoidance of 
performance demands is one potential way to protect self-
esteem, but it is only used if avoidance itself will not 
jeopardize self-esteem. This contrasts with Hill et al. 
(1986) because they did not assign top priority to the goal 
of self-esteem protection. On the other hand, insofar as 
depressives might still intentionally fail when short-term 
consequences result (as in Weary and Williams, 1990), this 
explanation is in accord with Hill et al. 's (1986) theory. 
The important point is that the short-term consequences of 
failure must not endanger self-esteem. Thus, unlike the 
conclusions of Weary and Williams (1990), depressives are 
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not hypothesized to maintain their "shaky self-confidence," 
and in turn their depression, from strategic failures, 
because this strategy is only used when there is little 
threat to self-esteem ("self-confidence") from current 
performances. 
Unfortunately, this speculation is based on the validi-
ty of comparing Weary and Williams's (1990) findings with 
those of the current study. Future strategic failure 
research should experimentally assess whether current task 
importance (self-esteem cost) is associated with a depressed 
person's decision about whether to fail. 
Performance scores 
Performance scores indicated no statistical evidence of 
depressive self-presentation, despite the omnibus 3-way 
interaction trend, and the significant simple mood x diff i-
culty expectancy interaction for future performance sub-
jects. Regardless of how difficult the second task was 
described to be, and regardless of whether the second task 
was expected, there were no reliable differences among 
depressed groups. Although it is tempting to suggest that 
Hill et al.'s (1986) theory is now invalidated, to do so 
would be inappropriate and premature, largely because of the 
low statistical power of the current study. Certainly, more 
powerful research should attempt to replicate the current 
design, or a similar design, before one "accepts" the null 
hypothesis of no group differences. 
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Discussion Summary and Conclusions 
The most striking finding was that depressed subjects 
did not intentionally fail an important task. This was true 
even when a very difficult future task was contingent upon 
successful completion of the first task, and when increased 
distress accompanied the expectation of a very difficult 
future task. It seems that self-esteem protection is 
primary. Avoidance of performance demands might be a 
significant goal of depressive self-presentation; however, 
when avoidance itself endangers self-esteem, it seems 
depressed people will put forth effort in order to perform 
well. So why then do depressed people frequently perform 
poorly on tasks requiring concentration, memory, and so on 
(see Gotlib & Hammen, 1992, pp. 113-139)? 
Based on the current study, one might expect that, with 
important tasks, the only role intentional performance plays 
is in the exacerbation of poor perf ormance--maybe something 
akin to giving up. Perhaps depressed people assess how well 
they are doing, accurately determine that they are experi-
encing difficulty, and then "throw in the towel." If this 
is the case, failure may indeed assist in the maintenance 
and exacerbation of depression; however, this would not be 
intentional failure, per se (i.e., the sort of failure 
discussed in Weary & Williams, 1990). 
Consider also that depressed subjects in the current 
study were less distressed overall than nondepressed sub-
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jects. Who would expect that, under public conditions, 
depressed subjects would report less distress than non-
depressed subjects? What protective goal would be served by 
reporting less distress? From a self-presentation perspec-
tive, this presentation of affect was anything but conserva-
tive or protective. So what were depressed subjects doing? 
Given that this experiment was a rare opportunity for 
depressed subjects to succeed on an important task (by 
design), it seems probable that they were capitalizing on an 
opportunity to gain self-esteem, and that they perhaps 
enjoyed some comfort as a result. This is absolutely 
contrary to Hill et al., who made clear their belief in the 
protective orientation of depressives. 
The foregoing analysis underscores the potential 
complexity of depressive self-presentation. It seems that 
depressives might intentionally perform poorly on trivial 
tasks for the sake of avoidance; yet, on important tasks, 
depressed people might perform poorly because of some type 
of deficits (e.g., see Gotlib & Hammen, 1992), combined 
possibly with a variant of giving up (intentional compo-
nent). However, depressed individuals seem to notice when 
they are capable of performing well on an important task, 
and at these times, they might shift to an acquisitive self-
presentation style, whereby, like nondepressed individuals, 
they are interested in gaining self-esteem. Future research 





































Answer = ALBUM 
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APPENDIX B 
MULTIPLE AFFECT ADJECTIVE CHECKLISTS 
MAACL-A 
on this sheet you will find words which describe different 
kinds of moods and feelings. Place a check in the s~ace 
beside the words which describe the way you are feeling 
rifht now, not the way you felt five minutes ago or when you 
go up, but ri~ht now. Some of the words may be alike, but 
check all of t e words that describe your feelings right 
now. 
1. active 24. irritated 
2 . afraid 25. joyful 
3. agreeable 26. lonely 
4. alone 27. low 
5. angry 28. mean 
6 . blue 29. merry 
7 . calm 30. nervous 
8. clean 31. outraged 
9 . contented 32. pleasant 
10. cooperative 33. polite 
11. cruel 34. rejected 
12. devoted 35. safe 
13. discontented 36. shaky 
14. discouraged 37. steady 
15. enraged 38. suffering 
16. fearful 39. tame 
17. fine 40. terrible 
18. free 41. understanding 
19. glad 42. unhappy 
20. gloomy 43. unsociable 
21. good-natured 44. upset 




On this sheet you will find words which describe different 
kinds of moods and feelings. Place a check in the space 
beside the words which describe the way you are feeling 
right now, not the way you felt five minutes ago or when you 
got up, but right now. Some of the words may be alike, but 
check all of the words that describe your feelings right 
now. 
1. alive 24. lucky 
2. amiable 25. mad 
3. awful 26. miserable 
4. bitter 27. off ended 
5 . cheerful 28. panicky 
6 . desperate 29. peaceful 
7 . destroyed 30. sad 
8. disagreeable 31. secure 
9 . disgusted 32. stormy 
10. enthusiastic 33. strong 
11. fit 34. sunk 
12. forlorn 35. sympathetic 
13. friendly 36. tender 
14. frightened 37. tense 
15. furious 38. thoughtful 
16. gay 39. tormented 
17. good 40. vexed 
18. happy 41. warm 
19. hopeless 42. willful 
20. inspired 43. wilted 
21. kindly 44. worrying 




PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE 
I.D. # 
Performance Attributions 
1. To what extent was your success or failure on the task 






2. To what extent was your success or failure due to how 




























Write in the space provided one major cause for your success 
or failure on the task: 
6. Was the cause of your success or failure due to 
something about you (internal) or something about other 
people or circumstances (external)? 
internal 1----2----3----4----5----6 external 
7. In the future when doing a task like this, to what 
extent will this cause be present? 
never 1----2----3----4----5----6 always 
8. Is this cause something that just affects doing this 
kind of task, or does it also influence other areas of 
your life? 
this type 1----2----3----4----5----6 other areas 
9. How important to you is success or failure on this 
task? 
not at all 1----2----3----4----5----6 extremely 
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PRE-MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE 
Pre-MC 




not at all very 
important important 
Please rate how much experience you have with this type of 
task: 
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10 




POST-PERFORMANCE MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE 
I.D.# 
PPMC 






2. Please rate how you think you did on the anagram task 






3. Was your performance on the anagram task a success or 
failure, according to the '13 or more correct' rule? 
(please circle your choice) 
success failure 
4. Did the experimenter tell you to expect a second 
anagram task if you succeed on the first anagram task? 
(please circle yes or no) 
yes no 
Please rate how easy or difficult you were told 











Hello. My name is 
for this study. First 
This will take roughly 
you will receive extra 
I'm the experimenter 
of all, thank you for participating. 
40 minutes and, as you probably know, 
credit for your psychology class. 
In this experiment, we are interested in gathering normative 
data on various questionnaires and tasks. Before we begin, 
let me assure you that all data collected will remain 
completely confidential and will be used only for the 
purposes of this research. All data will be coded, so your 
name won't be associated with it. 
Here is a consent form. Please read it carefully. If you 
consent to participate, sign it and give it back to me. 
(TAKE CONSENT FORM} 
Next, on this paper, I'd like you to write as many words as 
possible that begin with the letter 'S'. You will have 5 
minutes. Ready ...... Go. 
Now I'd like you to fill 
have instructions at the 
you read them carefully. 
packet of questionnaires 
to me. I'll be 
(LOCATION). 
out these questionnaires. Some 
top of the page. Please be sure 
After you're finished, put the 
in this envelope and give it back 
(TAKE ENVELOPE AND RETURN TO EXPERIMENT LOCATION) 
Next, on this paper, write as many numbers as you can, from 
100 backwards. You will have 60 seconds. Ready ....... Go. 
(SCORE THE BDI AND SELECT CONDITION FROM THE 'DEP' OR 'NDEP' 
LIST.) 
78 
Condition 1--Future Performance/Harder Expectancy 
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably 
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The 
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a 
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The 
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that 
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good 
predictor of college grades and aptitude test 
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have 
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes. Success is 
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to 
time and observe you. 
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this 
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done. 
(TAKE ENVELOPE) 
o.K. If, and only if, you successfully complete this task, 
you will perform a second anagram task. The second task is 
harder than the first. The words are 14 letters long, as 
compared to the first task, which has 5-letter anagrams; the 
second task contains words we plan to incorporate into an 
intelligence test for graduate students. 
Do you have any questions? (BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT 
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED) 
O.K. Let me just reiterate that if you get 13 or more 
correct in 12 minutes or less, you will perform the second 
task as well. Here's the first task. Work in any order, 
and you may write in the margins of the page. I'll put this 
stopwatch in front of you so you can keep track of the time 
that has elapsed. 
Ready . ............ go. 
(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS 
NOTES) 
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES) 
O.K. Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC). 
Thank you. Now, I will score your test. (SCORE TEST AND 
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.) So now 
you (will/will not) be taking the second task. 
Before you (leave/do the second task), I would like you to 
fill out some additional questionnaires and also--we'll do 
this first--on this paper, write as many numbers as you can, 
from 100 backwards. You will have 60 seconds. 
Ready ........ Go. 
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O.K. Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires. 
Again, when you're finished place them in this envelope and 
give it back to me. I'll 
be (LOCATION). 
(TAKE ENVELOPE, TELL SUBJECT THAT THERE IS NO SECOND 
TASK--IT WAS AN EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION. GIVE A 
DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY, AND THANK SUBJECT) 
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Condition 2--Future Performance/Similar Expectancy 
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably 
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The 
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a 
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The 
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that 
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good 
predictor of college grades and aptitude test 
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have 
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes. Success is 
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to 
time and observe you. 
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this 
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done. 
(TAKE ENVELOPE) 
O.K. If, and only if, you successfully complete this task, 
you will perform a second task. The second task is similar 
to the first. 
Do you have any questions? (BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT 
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED) 
O.K. Let me just reiterate that if you get 13 or more 
correct in 12 minutes or less, you will perform a second 
task as well. Here's the first task. Work in any order, 
and you may write in the margins of the page. I'll put this 
stopwatch in front of you so you can keep track of the time 
that has elapsed. 
Ready ............. go. 
(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS 
NOTES) 
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES) 
O.K. Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC). 
Thank you. Now, I will score your test. (SCORE TEST AND 
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.) So now 
you (will/will not) be taking the second task. 
Before you (leave/do the second task), I would like you to 
fill out some questionnaires and also--we'll do this first--
on this paper, write as many numbers as you can, from 100 
backwards. You will have 60 seconds. Ready ........ Go. 
O.K. Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires. 
Again, when you're finished place them in this envelope and 
give it back to me. I'll 
(LOCATION). 
(TAKE ENVELOPE, TELL SUBJECT THAT THERE IS NO SECOND 
TASK--IT WAS AN EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION. GIVE A 
DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY, AND THANK SUBJECT) 
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Condition 3--Future Performance/Easier Expectancy 
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably 
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The 
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a 
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The 
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that 
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good 
predictor of college grades and aptitude test 
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have 
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes. Success is 
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to 
time and observe you. 
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this 
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done. 
(TAKE ENVELOPE) 
O.K. If, and only if, you successfully complete this task, 
you will perform a second anagram task. The second task is 
much easier than the first. The words are 3 letters long, 
as compared to the first task, which has 5-letter anagrams; 
the second task contains words we plan to incorporate into 
an intelligence test for junior high school students. 
Do you have any questions? (BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT 
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED) 
O.K. Let me just reiterate that if you get 13 or more 
correct in 12 minutes or less, you will perform the second 
task as well. Here's the first task. Work in any order, 
and you may write in the margins of the page. I'll put this 
stopwatch in front of you so you can keep track of the time 
that has elapsed. 
Ready ............. go. 
(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS 
NOTES) 
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES) 
O.K. Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC). 
Thank you. Now, I will score your test. (SCORE TEST AND 
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.) So now 
you (will/will not) be taking the second task. 
Before you (leave/do the second task), I would like you to 
fill out some questionnaires and also--we'll do this first--
on this paper, write as many numbers as you can, from 100 
backwards. You will have 60 seconds. Ready ........ Go. 
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O.K. Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires. 
Again, when you're finished place them in this envelope and 
give it back to me. I'll 
be (LOCATION). 
(TAKE ENVELOPE, TELL SUBJECT THAT THERE IS NO SECOND 
TASK--IT WAS AN EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION. GIVE A 
DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY, AND THANK SUBJECT) 
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Condition 4--No Future Performance/Harder Expectancy 
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably 
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The 
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a 
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The 
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that 
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good 
predictor of college grades and aptitude test 
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have 
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes. Success is 
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to 
time and observe you. 
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this 
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done. 
(TAKE ENVELOPE) 
O.K. Normally, if a subject successfully completes this 
task, he or she would perform a second anagram task. The 
second task is harder than the first. The words are 13 
letters long, as compared to the first task, which has 
5-letter anagrams. However, you won't be performing the 
second task because I don't have enough time to administer 
it. You will still get full credit though. 
Do you have any questions? (BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT 
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED) 
O.K. Here's the task. Work 
in the margins of the page. 
front of you so you can keep 
elapsed. 
Ready . ............ go. 
in any order, and you may write 
I'll put this stopwatch in 
track of the time that has 
(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS 
NOTES) 
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES) 
O.K. Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC). 
Thank you. Now, I will score your test. (SCORE TEST AND 
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.) Again, 
you will not take a second anagram task. 
But before you leave, I would like you to fill out some 
questionnaires and also--we'll do this first--on this paper, 
write as many numbers as you can, from 100 backwards. You 
will have 60 seconds. Ready ........ Go. 
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Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires. Again, 
when you're finished place them in this envelope and give it 
back to me. I'll 
be (LOCATION). 
(TAKE ENVELOPE, GIVE A DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY, 
AND THANK SUBJECT) 
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Condition 5--No Future Performance/Similar Expectancy 
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably 
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The 
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a 
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The 
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that 
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good 
predictor of college grades and aptitude test 
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have 
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes. Success is 
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to 
time and observe you. 
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this 
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done. 
(TAKE ENVELOPE) 
O.K. Normally, if a subject successfully completes this 
task, he or she would perform a second anagram task. The 
second task is similar to the first. However, you won't be 
performing the second task because I don't have enough time 
to administer it. You will still get full credit though. 
Do you have any questions? (BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT 
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED) 
O.K. Here's the task. Work 
in the margins of the page. 
front of you so you can keep 
elapsed. 
Ready ............. go. 
in any order, and you may write 
I'll put this stopwatch in 
track of the time that has 
(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS 
NOTES) 
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES) 
O.K. Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC). 
Thank you. Now, I will score your test. (SCORE TEST AND 
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.) Again, 
you will not take a second anagram task. 
But before you leave, I would like you to fill out some 
questionnaires and also--we'll do this first--on this paper, 
write as many numbers as you can, from 100 backwards. You 
will have 60 seconds. Ready ........ Go. 
Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires. Again, 
when you're finished place them in this envelope and give it 
back to me. I'll 
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(LOCATION). 
(TAKE ENVELOPE, GIVE A DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY, 
AND THANK SUBJECT) 
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Condition 6--No Future Performance/Easier Expectancy 
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably 
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The 
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a 
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The 
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that 
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good 
predictor of college grades and aptitude test 
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have 
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes. Success is 
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to 
time and observe you. 
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this 
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done. 
(TAKE ENVELOPE) 
O.K. Normally, if a subject successfully completes this 
task, he or she would perform a second anagram task. The 
second task is much easier than the first. The words are 3 
letters long, as compared to the first task, which has 
5-letter anagrams. However, you won't be performing the 
second task because I don't have enough time to administer 
it. You will still get full credit though. 
Do you have any questions? (BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT 
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED) 
O.K. Here's the task. Work 
in the margins of the page. 
front of you so you can keep 
elapsed. 
Ready . ............ go. 
in any order, and you may write 
I'll put this stopwatch in 
track of the time that has 
(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS 
NOTES) 
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES) 
O.K. Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC). 
Thank you. Now, I will score your test. (SCORE TEST AND 
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.) Again, 
you will not take a second anagram task. 
But before you leave, I would like you to fill out some 
questionnaires and also--we'll do this first--on this paper, 
write as many numbers as you can, from 100 backwards. You 
will have 60 seconds. Ready ........ Go. 
Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires. Again, 
89 
when you're finished place them in this envelope and give it 
back to me. I'll 
be (LOCATION). 
(TAKE ENVELOPE, GIVE A DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY, 
AND THANK SUBJECT) 
APPENDIX I 
CONSENT AND DEBRIEF FORMS 
Consent Form 
The goals of this study are both scientific and 
humanitarian. By participating, you will be helping to 
expand our scientific knowledge about the relationship 
between mood and task performance. 
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In the study, you will be asked to complete several 
questionnaires and to do different tasks that will be 
described to you. The study will take about forty minutes, 
and for your participation you will receive credit for your 
introductory psychology class. 
All of the feelings, thoughts, and information that you 
provide will remain strictly confidential and will be 
published only in the form of statistical summaries. No 
individual will be identified. In fact, you will simply 
have a subject number. At the end of the study, you will be 
told the purpose and hypotheses of the study in detail. Any 
questions you may have about the procedures will be 
answered. If at any time during the course of the study you 
feel you cannot complete it, you may withdraw without 
penalty. 
This study is being conducted under the auspices of Dr. 
Jeanne Albright of the Psychology Department of Loyola 
University. Please feel free to ask any questions. If you 
would like additional information about the study, you may 
also contact the investigator at the location below. Thank 
you for your participation in this study. 
I have read the above and understand it. 
Signature 
Evan Finer 
Darnen Hall--Room 1028 





Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of 
this research is to gain information about the relationship 
between mood and our ability to do simple tasks. 
In this study, you completed an anagram task. We are 
interested in learning whether individuals who are currently 
experiencing feelings of depression or sadness take longer 
to complete this task, and/or make more errors on this task. 
We are also interested in learning whether people will 
sometimes try to fail this task in order to avoid having to 
do a future task. 
Generally, in psychology, researchers are interested in 
average responses, so we won't be looking at just your 
responses. Instead, we combine the responses from everybody 
in the study, and look at how people responded, on the 
average. All of your responses are strictly confidential, 
and you will never be identified as a subject in this study. 
To maintain data integrity, we ask that you not disclose--to 
anybody--anything about this study. Your cooperation in 
this regard is greatly appreciated. 
If you have any questions or comments, or are interested in 
receiving feedback about your responses, please contact Dr. 
Jeanne Albright of the Psychology Department, 1046 Darnen 
Hall, 508-2971. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1Effect size estimates were based on Cohen's (1988) 
suggestion of dividing the value of the difference between 
means by any groups standard deviation ("any" because 
variances are assumed equal; e.g., see p.20). Cohen (1988) 
was also the reference for estimating·statistical power and 
the magnitude ("large," "medium," or "small") of effect 
sizes. 
2This appears to be a manipulation of publicity. 
However, because the purpose of this study is to investigate 
self-handicapping, and because the experimenter was always 
present (i.e., this is not a traditional manipulation of 
publicity), this study was presented with the self-
handicapping literature, rather than the public-private 
literature. 
3aaumgardner (1991) did not present her data in a 
manner that was amenable to deciphering whether the self-
handicapping findings of the Baumgardner et al. (1985) 
study, which did not employ a depressed-nondepressed subject 
variable, were replicated. Thus, the present paper excludes 
this discussion. 
4
The PPMC questionnaire, item 5, initially only 
requested a rating of "how easy or difficult [the subject 
was] told the second anagram task [would] be compared to the 
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first task" if they responded "yes" to item 4, which asked 
whether a subject expected a second task upon successful 
completion of the first task. After running 14 subjects, 
the researchers realized that they wanted a rating of the 
second task difficulty regardless of whether a subject 
expected the second task. Thus, from that point forward, 
the PPMC item 5 was filled out by all subjects. This was 
accomplished by changing the questionnaire. The revised 
form is in appendix G; as can be seen, item 5 was changed 
such that it no longer makes responding contingent on 
subjects' future performance condition. 
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5Two subjects (1 was a nondepressed-future-performance-
similar subject; the other was a nondepressed-future-
performance-harder subject) were omitted from this analysis 
because of a mechanical failure: Their experimental packets 
were missing a sheet of paper for this task. 
6Recall that the goal of this study was to examine how 
anagram score differences were related to subjects' social 
goals (theoretically the avoidance of future performance 
demands and potential self-esteem loss), not subjects' 
ability. Thus, subjects with poor verbal ability were not 
suitable for the analysis. 
7
This 3-way interaction was significant when the 
subjects who failed were included in the analysis (I(2, 297) 
= 3.78, E = .02). 
8Note that the mentioned difference between 
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nondepressed-future-performance-harder subjects and 
nondepressed-future-performance-easier subjects was based on 
Tukey (HSD) contrasts among nondepressed-future-performance 
groups (an alpha adjustment for 3 comparisons), not on Tukey 
(HSD) contrasts among all groups. The rationale for 
conducting follow-up tests in this manner was that the 
former set of contrasts followed from a priori predictions, 
while the latter set of contrasts was entirely exploratory. 
9Before conducting the 3-way (mood x future performance 
x difficulty expectancy) ANCOVA, a 4-way (mood x future 
performance x difficulty expectancy x MAACL order [AB v. 
BA]) ANCOVA was conducted to determine whether the order of 
administration of the MAACL forms (A, B) had an effect on 
distress change scores. Results revealed no effects (ps > 
.05). Note also that the order of administration of the 
MAACL was counterbalanced. 
lOA Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was the 
planned approach to these tests. Unfortunately, the MANOVA 
could not confidently be conducted because the assumption of 
homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices was not 
supported (Box M = 1029.85, ~(495, 44125) = 1.75, 2 < .001; 
see Stevens, 1992, pp.265-268). 
11
This alpha represents the product of the non-adjusted 
p of .004 and 63 comparisons (see Stevens, 1992, pp. 7-9). 
All other effects were associated with a probability of a 
Type I error above .5. 
100 
12
Although an argument could be levelled against not 
statistically removing the effects of self-evaluation (self-
esteem) from analyses, the response was that partialling the 
effects of self-esteem from depression would remove too much 
of depression itself because these constructs are strongly 
related, both theoretically (e.g., DSM-III-R; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987), and empirically (e.g., Weary 
& Williams, 1990; Socco & Hokanson, 1978; the current study 
found that the BDI and the Rosenberg correlated at E = -.65, 
2 < .001). Indeed, in retrospect, the self-evaluation 
difference between depressed-future-performance subjects and 
depressed-no-future-performance subjects might have been 
anticipated based on the difference between these groups on 
the BDI (see Method section, subjects subsection). 
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